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Oct 16, 2026 · 2026 #39 Editorial

Venture Opportunities - Hidden in Plain Sight

This is not a crisis

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## Editorial:

Venture Opportunities - Hidden in Plain Sight

Venture Capital is having a moment. The label is used by many investors who have wildly different business models. It disguises those differences. But the participants are now debating openly and vociferously which model they prefer. I am definitively a believer in early stage managers finding most if not all of the future winners. The current concentration of LP money into fewer larger funds does nothing to change that.

But the facts are quite clear as [Murph Capital’s Q3 fundraising report](https://murphcapital.substack.com/p/state-of-vc-fundraising-q3-2026) shows. It tracked 152 funds announcing closes. Twenty-six funds of $500 million or more took 76% of the capital. Its 86 emerging funds, defined as Fund I or II under $250 million, raised just 9%. Bessemer alone raised more than all 86 combined.

These are publicly announced closes, not a complete census. But the direction is clear within the sample. LP money is concentrating. Big funds are getting bigger and small funds are getting harder to raise. LPs are speaking with their checkbooks.

The underlying reality is driving this trend. The large AI companies, across all sectors, are attracting capital because the opportunity to place large bets for significant multiples is hard to ignore.

That is defining every stage of venture capital. Less and less companies are getting larger and larger checks from fewer investors. To play that game a fund has to write bigger checks than ever, at every stage. This impacts fund size and pro-rata planning.

#### Kyle has noticed ( )

[Kyle Harrison’s account of venture’s “short kings”](https://investing101.substack.com/p/the-death-of-venture-capitals-short) is uncomfortable reading for anyone attached to the small-partnership model. He notes that USV and Benchmark - both previously committed to disciplined venture investing at the early stage - have increased the capital they manage.

USV disputes Kyle’s conclusions - that raising more means abandoning its approach. [Fred Wilson’s response](https://avc.xyz/the-short-king-is-dead-long-live-the-short-king) ( ) separates the new $500 million core fund from the new $400 million opportunity fund. He concedes that USV wants to lead larger rounds because the market is making it do so. But he still believes single-digit-billion-dollar outcomes can produce attractive returns at its ownership levels.

Wilson uses Etsy and Duolingo to illustrate the arithmetic: the ownership USV bought in either would be enough to return the new core fund.

#### Jon is describing a different opportunity

[Jon Callaghan](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/scarcity-vs-abundance-jon-callaghan-6uc1e) ( ) rejects the game on the field. He puts the apparent contradiction plainly: “We’re in a capital bubble and an innovation boom.”

His argument is that investors are treating AI as a brief contest to own a handful of inevitable winners, while the technology is making it possible for many more people to create companies over many years. Cheap development opens opportunities well beyond the frontier labs.

he is right that the game will change - possibly rapidly. And the opportunity to invest early in larger outcomes will not disappear. The investment opportunity will still belong to the manager who can find great companies early enough, at a sensible price.

#### Are the small managers still getting in?

Anecdotes are not helpful in general, unless they illustrate a broader opportunity.

There is a useful example inside Murph’s report. Silent Ventures raised an $85 million second fund. I checked Silent’s investment history through the [new SignalRank API](https://intel.signalrank.ai). It records Silent joining Saronic’s seed financing in February 2023 and its Series A that October. [Silent’s own announcement](https://silentventures.substack.com/p/saronic-raises-55m-series-a-will) confirms both investments. [Saronic’s announcement](https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/naval-maritime-autonomy-company-raises-55-million-in-series-a-fundraise-301951085.html) independently names Silent among the Series A investors.

Saronic subsequently announced a [$1.75 billion Series D at a $9.25 billion valuation](https://medium.com/saronic-technologies/saronic-closes-1-75b-series-d-at-9-25b-valuation-to-accelerate-a-new-era-of-maritime-autonomy-a801be818746). Silent was there before that valuation, alongside larger investors.

The GPx relationship makes the example more interesting. In [Tectonic’s interview](https://www.tectonicdefense.com/exclusive-brian-singermans-gpx-backs-silent-ventures-85m-fund-ii/), the GPx model is to back specialist early-stage managers and then invest alongside them in later rounds. The manager supplies relationships and judgment; another pool supplies follow-on capital. The commercial terms and execution still have to work, but the specialist does not have to become a giant to remain useful.

Silent is not alone. There are hundreds of early-stage managers who excel at sourcing, selecting and investing in future winners. LPs, swept up in the moment, will likely not be LPs in these smaller funds.

#### What would make an emerging manager a good investment?

Being new is not enough. Nor is being small. And for some LPs, small just makes their investment impossible. They are not set up to manage 100 $20m checks. They are more likely to manage 4 $500m checks.

[Cambridge Associates says](https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/venture-capital/) emerging managers account for a majority of top-quartile performers in a given vintage. But a large multiple of a small number is still too small.

That is a reason an emerging manager requires a different group of LPs. They have to be characterized by an affinity with smaller checks into the best emerging managers and be capable of scaling across many funds.

That ecosystem does exist in the form of former successful founders, family offices and such. But it needs to go further.

The ‘hidden in plain sight’ opportunity is to become the supplier of capital to the 200-300 early-stage funds that find 100% of the winning companies before they are obvious. That can take the form of a fund-of-funds approach like Michael Kim of Cendana, or a pro-rata supply like SignalRank. So far the market is open and undercapitalized. That is the opportunity.

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